

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-10  
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-05 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-20 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 SIG-03 NRC-07  
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P 202018Z JUL 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY

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USSALT TWO/CTB

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, SOPN

SUBJECT: JULY 20 ROUNDUP: PRESS ITEMS OF ARMS CONTROL  
INTEREST

LONDON FOR AMB/EX, SOFIA FOR AMBASSADOR

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1. DUSKO DODER OF WASHINGTON POST REPORTED THAT MBFR TALKS  
RECESSED YESTERDAY IN VIENNA WITH OFFICIALS CITING SUB-  
STANTIAL PROGRESS FOR FIRST TIME IN NEGOTIATIONS. DODER  
SAID U.S. OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON STATED THAT RECENT MOVES  
BY NATO AND WARSAW PACT HAVE ESTABLISHED "FRAMEWORK THAT  
COMBINES COMMON ELEMENTS" OF TWO SIDES AND THUS ALLOWS FOR  
"MORE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS." OFFICIALS CAUTIONED, HOWEVER,

THAT "SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES" CONCERNING STRENGTH ESTIMATES WILL FACE TWO SIDES WHEN THEY RESUME MBFR TALKS IN SEPTEMBER, DODER SAID. HE SAID OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS IN WASHINGTON AND VIENNA AT END OF 15TH ROUND OF TALKS FOLLOWED WARSAW PACT INITIATIVE LAST MONTH THAT APPEARED TO CLOSE LONG-EXISTING GAP. DODER SAID MOSCOW'S ACCEPTANCE OF ASYMMETRICAL CUTS THAT WOULD LEAD TO COMMON CEILING FOR COMBINED FORCES OF BOTH ALLIANCES IS COMPLICATED NOW BY DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND SOVIET DATA ON SIZE OF WARSAW PACT TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALTHOUGH ENCOURAGED BY SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF COMMON CEILINGS, U.S. OFFICIALS SAID NO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE BEFORE DISCREPANCY

ON DATA IS RESOLVED, DODER REPORTED.

2. DREW MIDDLETON OF NEW YORK TIMES, REPORTING ON RECESS OF MBFR TALKS, SAID MOSCOW HAS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS U.S. PROPOSAL THAT IN RETURN FOR AN UNSPECIFIED REDUCTION IN WARSAW PACT TANK STRENGTH, U.S. WOULD WITHDRAW 1,000 SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE. "U.S. WILLINGNESS EVEN TO DISCUSS THIS EXCHANGE HAS PROVOKED SHARP CRITICISM AMONG EUROPEAN NATO ALLIES," MIDDLETON SAID.

3. WRITING IN WALL STREET JOURNAL, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION SENIOR FELLOW CHARLES A. SORRELS DISCUSSED SOME POSSIBLE UNCLASSIFIED

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CONSEQUENCES OF BREAKDOWN IN SALT TWO. "MORE IMMEDIATE, IMPORTANT IMPACT WOULD BE POLITICAL," HE SAID, "BECAUSE ALTHOUGH SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE PRECEDED SALT BY SEVERAL YEARS, IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE UNDAMAGED WITHOUT SALT." HE SAID WITH "VERY HIGH PRIORITY AND HEAVY BUDGETARY COMMITMENT OF SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUING MAJOR MOMENTUM IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE PROGRAMS, IT IS HARD TO VISUALIZE MUCH GREATER SOVIET EFFORT OUTSIDE OF SALT. IF SOVIETS ABANDONED ABM TREATY IN AFTERMATH OF FAILURE OF SALT TWO PROCESS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THAT WOULD BE SETBACK TO MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SALT... IF SALT TWO TALKS BROKE DOWN, PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE OF U.S. WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH INCENTIVES FOR RENEWING THEM, COMBINING DEMONSTRATED WILL TO COMPETE WITH AN OFFER OF RESTRAINT TO BE RECIPROCATED...SINCE STRATEGIC BALANCE IS NOT SELF-REGULATING AND SALT'S REALISTIC CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IS ONLY MODEST, CAREFULLY MANAGED U.S. COMPETITIVENESS -- RATHER THAN BEING INHERENTLY ANTI-THETICAL TO STABILITY -- IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO DIFFICULT TASK OF PRESERVING STABILITY."

4. GEORGE WILSON OF WASHINGTON POST REPORTED THAT CIA

SAID SOVIET POPULATION IS NOT PROTECTED FROM ATTACK TO EXTENT THAT KREMLIN COULD LOGICALLY REGARD NUCLEAR WAR AS RISK WORTH TAKING. CIA, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN INTENSIFYING SINCE LATE 1960S, CONCLUDED THAT SOVIET PROGRAM HAS MANY OF OUR SHORTCOMINGS, INCLUDING APATHY BY "LARGE SEGMENT OF POPULATION." SENATOR JOHN CULVER, IN NEWS CONFERENCE, TERMED 16-PAGE CIA REPORT "FIRST COMPREHENSIVE AND AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS" OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM TO BE MADE PUBLIC. CULVER SAID REPORT'S KEY FINDING IS THAT EXPANDED SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM DOES NOT "ADVERSELY AFFECT STRATEGIC BALANCE" BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR. CIA ESTIMATED THAT IT WOULD COST TWO BILLION IN 1976 DOLLARS

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TO DUPLICATE SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM IN EXISTENCE THAT YEAR. HENRY BRADSHAW OF WASHINGTON STAR SAID CULVER TOLD NEWS CONFERENCE THAT U.S. SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT LAUNCHING COSTLY CRASH PROGRAM THAT WOULD REPRESENT RADICAL CHANGE FROM OUR OWN EXISTING PROGRAMS.

5. BERNARD WEINRAUB OF NEW YORK TIMES REPORTED THAT AIR FORCE HAS CONCLUDED THAT PROPOSED MOBILE MISSILE SYSTEM FOR 1980S WILL NEED AREA ABOUT SIZE OF CONNECTICUT, OR 4,000 TO 6,500 SQUARE MILES. OFFICIALS SAID FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS PROGRAM PROBABLY WOULD EMERGE AS MOST COSTLY AND LARGEST MISSILE EFFORT EVER UNDERTAKEN BY U.S., WITH TOTAL COSTS RANGING FROM 20 TO 27 BILLION DOLLARS. AIR FORCE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SAID SEVEN AREAS WERE "GEOTECHNICALLY SUITABLE" FOR DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE SYSTEM: CENTRAL NEVADA GREAT BASIN IN NEVADA AND WESTERN UTAH; MOJAVE DESERT IN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA; LUKE AIR FORCE RANGE IN ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA; WEST TEXAS-RIO GRAND BASIN IN TEXAS AND NEW MEXICO; TEXAS-NEW MEXICO HIGH PLAINS, WHICH INCLUDES OKLAHOMA; AND SOUTH PLATTE PLAINS, COVERING KANSAS, NEBRASKA AND COLORADO. CARTER ADMINISTRATION DECISION IS EXPECTED TO BE MADE BY NOVEMBER ON TYPE OF MISSILE PROGRAM THAT WILL BE SOUGHT AND ITS LOCATION.

6. IN WASHINGTON POST OP-ED PAGE ARTICLE, RECENT SOVIET EXILE ALEXANDER YANOV CITED CHRONOLOGICAL COINCIDENCES AS "REPEATED EVIDENCE" THAT SOMEONE WITHIN SOVIET LEADERSHIP ITSELF IS ATTEMPTING TO THWART BREZHNEV'S "PERSONAL HOPE OF ENTERING INTO HISTORY AS GREAT PEACEMAKER." UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION OF YANOV ARTICLE WAS THAT BREZHNEV HAD CHOSEN "DARING STRATEGY OF DETENTE WITH WEST" AND HAD INSISTED ON TALKS ABOUT LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS AS CHIEF

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TASK OF HIS PERIOD. YANOV CITED SUCH CHRONOLOGICAL COINCIDENCES AS HELSINKI DECLARATION AND CUBAN INCURSION IN ANGOLA, "MOMENT OF GREATEST OPTIMISM IN STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS AND SOVIET AIRLIFT IN ETHIOPIA" AS EVIDENCE THAT SOMEONE IS TRYING TO TRIP UP BREZHNEV. HE RECALLED THAT IN 1957, TWO-THIRDS OF SOVIET "MONOLITHIC LEADERSHIP WERE FLUNG ON DUNGHEAP OF HISTORY" IN CRUDE ACTION THAT UNTIED KHRUSHCHEV'S HANDS FOR REAL INTRODUCTION OF DE-STALINIZATION. "BREZHNEV HAS NOT PASSED HIS 1957," YANOV SAID, NOTING THAT OPPONENTS OF DETENTE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE BECOMING "EVEN STRONGER AND MORE SHAMELESS." HE SAID "HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT TACTIC OF 'CONSENSUS' WHICH BREZHNEV PURSUES IN DISTINCTION TO KHRUSHCHEV, IS NOT WORKING. IT TURNED OUT THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO COMBINE HELSINKI AND ANGOLA. IT TURNED OUT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FINALLY TO

MAKE CHOICE BETWEEN TACTIC OF 'CONSENSUS' AND STRATEGY OF DETENTE. UNTIL NOW, BREZHNEV HAS NOT BEEN CAPABLE OF THAT DRAMATIC CHOICE...UNTIL BREZHNEV PUTS HIS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER, HIS LIFE'S DREAM CANNOT BE REALIZED. AND IF HE DOES NOT PUT IT IN ORDER, FUTURE HISTORIAN WILL BE LEFT TO SUPPOSE ONLY ONE OF TWO THINGS: EITHER HE LIED, IN SPEAKING OF HIS DESIRE FOR PEACE, OR HE WAS INCAPABLE OF REALIZING IT -- THAT IS, HE WAS REALLY ONLY PETTY POLITICAL PLOTTER IN SOLZHENITSYN EPOCH." CHRISTOPHER

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## Message Attributes

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